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Secrecy in University and College
Tenure Deliberations: Placing
Appropriate Limits on Academic
Freedom
BY JOHN DEWITT GREGORY*

INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court
first suggested that the concept of academic freedom deserved constitutional recognition. In his dissent to Adler v. Board of Education,' Justice Douglas observed:
What happens under [the Feinberg Law] is typical of what happens in
a police state. Teachers are under constant surveillance; their pasts are
combed for signs of disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to
dangerous thoughts. A pall is cast over the classrooms. There can be no
real academic freedom in that environment. Where suspicion fills the air
and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of
the free intellect.

Fifteen years later, Justice Douglas saw his earlier dissenting view in
3
Adler vindicated. For the first time, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
a majority of the Court explicitly recognized academic freedom as a
constitutionally protected right under the first amendment."
Since Adler, the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. 1952, Howard University; J.D. 1959, Harvard University.
I am grateful for the research assistance of Andrew L. Oringer, a member of the
Class of 1984, and to Vice-Dean Stuart Rabinowitz of the Hofstra University School of
Law. for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
' 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding New York's Feinberg Law, which disqualified
from employment public school teachers who were members of "subversive
organizations").

I Id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

3 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating the "anti-subversive" provisions of New York's
Feinberg Law).

' Id. See text accompanying notes 29-30 infra.
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courts have all reviewed claims of academic freedom. These claims
have met with varying degrees of judicial acceptance.
Recently, federal courts have been confronted with a novel and unprecedented academic freedom claim. In In re Dinnan,6 the plaintiff
sued the Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, claiming that
as the result of sex discrimination she was unlawfully denied promotion
and tenure, and terminated as a faculty member. In a discovery proceeding she sought to question a member of the tenure committee concerning his vote. He refused to answer such questions, claiming an academic freedom privilege under the first amendment.
Similarly, in Gray v. Board of Higher Education,' the plaintiff, a
Black male community college instructor in the City University of New
York system, instituted an action under the Civil Rights Acts,' alleging
that he was denied promotion and reappointment with tenure because
of race discrimination. During discovery proceedings, he requested two
members of the institution's tenure committee to reveal their votes. As
in Dinnan, the defendants refused to answer certain questions, claiming
that their votes and discussions were entitled to an academic freedom
privilege.
In this Article I shall argue that the deliberations and votes of university and college tenure committees should not be kept confidential
under the guise of academic freedom. Indeed, claims that tenure deliberations and votes are confidential because of "academic freedom" are
entirely inconsistent with the purposes for which academic freedom has
been recognized. Part I summarizes the legal literature and judicial developments defining academic freedom and its scope and purpose. This
summary includes a survey of scholarly commentary on the subject, the
development of the influential position of the American Association of
University Professors, and a brief review of the constitutional development of the concept of academic freedom, gleaned from decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and state and federal courts. Part II examines in detail the novel academic freedom claims asserted in Dinnan
and Gray. Part III then considers the desirability of restricting the
Gray court's application of academic freedom. The section begins by
exploring the traditional policy of judicial noninterference in academic
disputes and the modification of that policy in recent years. It then disSee notes 20-30 and accompanying text infra.
661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubergs, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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cusses whether such noninterference is appropriate in cases involving
the academic freedom claims of university tenure committees, especially
in light of the link between judicial deference and university discriminatory practices. Finally, the section argues that despite Gray's failure
to specify whether academic freedom protects individual tenure committee members or the entire university, extending this protection to either
party exceeds the scope of academic freedom.
I.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM -

ITS DEFINITION, DEVELOPMENT, SCOPE
AND PURPOSE

In evaluating the recently asserted academic freedom privilege
claimed to protect secrecy in tenure deliberations, it is helpful to examine the concept of academic freedom as it has been described in earlier and varied contexts. There is general agreement that current academic freedom doctrine derived from concepts in the nineteenth century
German university.' One of the earlier attempts to define academic
freedom in its modern context was Professor Machlup's
characterization:
Academic freedom consists in the absence of, or protection from, such
restraints or pressures, chiefly in the form of sanctions threatened by state
or church authorities or by the authorities, faculties, or students of colleges
and universities, but occasionally also by other power groups in society as are designed to create in the minds of academic scholars (teachers, research workers, and students in colleges and universities) fears and anxieties that may inhibit them from freely studying and investigating whatever
they are interested in, and from freely discussing, teaching, or publishing

See Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976). Professor Goldstein
notes:
Although some aspects of intellectual freedom embodied in the concept
of academic freedom find their sources in antiquity, the modern development of the doctrine of academic freedom is derived largely from the nineteenth century German concepts of lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit - freedom
of teaching and learning. The basic concepts were that a university faculty
member was free to teach what and how he thought best, with university
authorities or external agencies such as government, imposing only the
most minimal restraints on either teacher or student.
Id. at 1299. Although both principles were central to the German academy, lehrfreiheit
is more relevant to the recently asserted academic freedom claims. See Goldstein, Academic Freedom, Its Meaning and Underlying Premisesas Seen Through the American
Experience, 11 ISRAEL L. REV. 52 (1976). A more elaborate discussion of the German
influence may be found in R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 367-412 (1955).
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whatever opinions they have reached."0

Other commentators, consistent with Professor Machlup's definition,
identify as central to academic freedom the protection of college and
university faculty members in carrying out their functions of teaching
and research." In sum, academic freedom "signifies the intellectual autonomy of the members of the academic community - freedom of the
faculty in research and teaching, freedom of the students in learning,
and freedom of both from imposed conceptions of the truth."' 2
Any discussion of the development of academic freedom would be
incomplete without acknowledging the central role and critical contribution of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).
The AAUP's Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure was
formed in 1915, having as its primary purpose "to formulate principles
and procedures, the observance of which would insure intellectual freedom in colleges and universities."' 3 Subsequently, the American Council on Education issued its 1925 Conference Statement on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, which the AAUP endorsed a year later." Finally, after several conferences, representatives of the AAUP and the
Association of American Colleges formulated and issued the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure," restating
the principles enunciated in the 1925 Conference Statement. The 1940
" Machlup, On Some Misconceptions ConcerningAcademic Freedom, 41 AM. A.U.
PROFESSORS BULL. 753, 753-54 (1955).
See Fuchs, Academic Freedom - Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 431 (1963). Fuchs states:
Academic freedom is that freedom of members of the academic community, assembled in colleges and universities, which underlies the effective
performance of their functions of teaching, learning, practice of the arts,
and research. The right to academic freedom is recognized in order to
enable faculty members and students to carry on their roles.
Id. at 431; see also Hunter, FederalAntibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some
Problems With Enforcement Procedures, 27 EMORY L.J. 609, 617 (1978) ("The term
'academic freedom' encompasses a group of interests important to teachers, scholars,
students and administrators from elementary to graduate and professional schools. The
interests all relate, to a greater or lesser degree, to the transmission of knowledge and
the nourishment of creative thought.").
1" Kadish, Church-Related Law Schools: Academic Values and Deference to Religion, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161, 166 (1982).
11AAUP, The 1915 Declarationof Principles - Academic Freedom and Tenure,
40 AM. A.U. PROFESSORS BULL. 90, 90-91 (1954).
" Academic Freedom and Tenure - Statement of Principles,40 AM. A.U. PROFESSORS BULL. 80, 81 (1954) (referring to prior endorsement of 1925 Conference
Statement).
15Id.
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Statement of Principles remains the AAUP's official position on academic freedom.
In response to the proceedings in the United States District Court in
Matter of Dinnan,'6 the AAUP issued its most recent report, A Preliminary Statement on Judicially Compelled Disclosurein the Nonrenewal
of Faculty Appointments. 7 In a later proceeding in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Gray v. Board of Higher Education," this report was a crucial factor in the court's decision."
The United States Supreme Court during the last several years has
issued several decisions touching on academic freedom. Justice Douglas'
dissent in Adler was the first statement by a Supreme Court Justice in
which academic freedom specifically was recognized.2" Wieman v. Updegraff,2' decided the same term, struck down an Oklahoma statutory
loyalty oath which applied to all state officers and employees. Although
the majority's decision rested upon the statute's arbitrary and discriminatory exclusion of persons from public employment based solely on
organizational membership, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence heralded
the Court's explicit recognition of academic freedom which followed in
later cases. While Justice Frankfurter's opinion contained no explicit
reference to academic freedom, it clearly embraced academic freedom
principles to which he would afford constitutional protection:
By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech
and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects all persons no matter what their calling. But, in view
of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights
which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth
Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought,
in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly
into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit
which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.22
"6No. 79-42-Ath. (M.D. Ga. filed May 24, 1979) (contempt order).
" 67 ACADEME Feb.-Mar. 1981, at 27 [hereafter AAUP Disclosure Statement].
692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
" See notes 32-69 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Gray case.
20 See Murphy, Academic Freedom - An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 447, 454 (1963); see also Comment, Academic Freedom - Its
Constitutional Context, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 600, 609 (1968).
2, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

Id. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He further observed, in a famous and
frequently cited passage:
To regard teachers - in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the university - as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to engage in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster
2
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Five years later in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,23 which overturned a
teacher's contempt conviction for refusal to answer questions about a
classroom lecture, Chief Justice Warren, in a dictum as strong as the
language in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Wieman, observed:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
mocracy that is played by those who guide and train
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
ties would imperil the future of our Nation .

. .

American universities
the vital role in a deour youth. To impose
colleges and universi. Scholarship cannot

flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die."

During the next decade, the Court made two additional important
pronouncements related to academic freedom. In Barenblatt v. United
States,2" the Court upheld the defendant's contempt conviction for refusing to answer questions posed during a congressional investigation,
but reiterated its belief that "inquiries cannot be made into the teaching
that is pursued in our educational institutions." 6 In Shelton v. Tucker,27 the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas statute requiring all
teachers in state supported schools and colleges to file annual affidavits
listing their memberships or contributions to organizations. Although
the Court invalidated the statute because of its overbreadth, the opinion'
noted that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nothose habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for
responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion.
Id. at 196.
23 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
24 Id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
2' 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
26 Id. at 112. The Court explained its position in the following passage:
Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching that
is pursued in any of our educational institutions. When academic teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-freedom, so essential to the wellbeing of the Nation are claimed, this Court will always be on the alert
against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain.
But this does not mean that the Congress is precluded from interrogating a
witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational institution is not a
constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that may otherwise be
within the constitutional legislative domain merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls.
Id.
2, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

19831

Tenure Committee Deliberations

1029

where more vital than in the community of American Schools.""
Thus, the stage was set for the first explicit recognition by a majority
of the Court of a constitutional basis for principles of academic freedom. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 9 Justice Brennan wrote for the
Court:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom . .

.

.The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of

ideas."'"

II.

DINNAN AND GRAY: A NOVEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM CLAIM

The recent In re Dinnan" and Gray v. Board of Higher Education3 2
cases have raised a novel and unprecedented academic freedom claim in
the federal courts.
The relevant facts and issues in both cases were virtually identical.
The one distinguishing factor is that in Dinnan the plaintiff alleged sex
discrimination, while in Gray the plaintiff alleged race discrimination."
In both cases, members of a college or university tenure committee3
Id. at 487.
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating the anti-subversive provisions of New York's
Feinberg Law on grounds of vagueness and because "public employment, including
academic employment, may [not] be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional
rights which could not be abridged by direct government action").
,oId. at 603 (citation omitted).
, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubergs, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
32 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
" Although Dinnan involved a claim of employment discrimination under title VII,
while Gray involved a claim of civil rights violations, the differing results in the two
cases do not stem from the differences in the underlying claims. Rather, the decisions
reflect fundamentally different approaches to academic freedom analysis.
34 Here, and in the balance of this Article, the term "tenure committee" is used to
refer to the faculty committee which votes on applications for promotion or tenure and
makes recommendations to those having the authority to appoint to faculty positions,
promote to higher academic ranks, or confer tenure. Such committees are generally the
college's or university's Board of Trustees, Board of Regents, or a similar governing
body. They are variously denominated; in Dinnan, for example, the recommending
body was the university's College of Education Promotion Review Committee, and in
Gray it was the college's Personnel and Budget (P&B) Committee. In some institutions, an ad hoc faculty committee performs the function. While the tenure committee
customarily makes the initial evaluations of an application for promotion or tenure,
additional reviews and recommendations to the institution's governing body are often
made by others in an institution's administrative hierarchy, such as the provost and the
28
2-
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refused, during discovery proceedings, to divulge their votes on the denial of the plaintiff's promotion or tenure application. The refusal in
each case was based partly upon the assertion that the votes and deliberations of tenure committee members are protected from disclosure by
an "academic freedom privilege." Although two circuit courts similarly
framed the issues, they engaged in strikingly different analyses and
reached results which, while superfically similar, are fundamentally
different.
In Dinnan the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the claim of
privilege based upon academic freedom had not previously been considered or recognized by any court, and rejected Professor Dinnan's arguments "on the basis of fundamental principles of law and sound public
policy." 35 After observing that "[t]he basis of justice is the truth and our
system frowns upon impediments to ascertaining that truth,"36 the court
briefly reviewed the law of privilege, identifying the origins and rationales for the constitutionally protected privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, the
spousal witness privilege, the physician-patient privilege, and the attorney's "work-product" privilege. The court defined privilege as the right
not to give testimony,37 and concluded that "[pirivileges are based upon
the idea that certain societal values are more important than the search
for truth." 38 Acknowledging the value of academic freedom and recognizing that the Supreme Court frequently has upheld academic freedom
in the face of government pressure,39 the Dinnan court found inapposite
those Supreme Court cases upon which Professor Dinnan relied:
[I]n all those cases there was an attempt to suppress ideas by the government. Ideas may be suppressed just as effectively by denying tenure as by
prohibiting the teaching of certain courses. Quite bluntly, this Court feels
that the government should stay out of academic affairs. However, these
issues are not presented in the instant case. Here a private plaintiff is
attempting to enforce her constitutional and statutory rights in an employment situation. Therefore, the reasoning behind the cited cases simply does
not apply here.' °

Finally, the court considered Professor Dinnan's claim of "institutional academic freedom," based on the decision in Regents of the Unipresident.
" Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 427.

Id.
31Id. at 428.
31 Id. at 429.
3IId. at 430.
" Id. (emphasis in original).
36
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versity of California v. Bakke."' In Bakke, the Supreme Court defined
"institutional academic freedom" as the freedom of the university to
make its own judgments as to education."' The Dinnan court rejected
this claim, however, relying on the plaintiff's allegations that "the University of Georgia decided a tenure application on other than academic
grounds, which clearly takes it outside of what the Bakke Court envisioned to be the limits of academic freedom.""3 Thus, the Dinnan court
supported judicial nonintervention in such tenure evaluation subjects as
teaching, research, and scholarship. The court, however, found intervention necessary and appropriate whenever tenure evaluations "can be
shown to have been used as a mechanism to obscure discrimination
.... "" Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the district court
compelling discovery and holding Professor Dinnan in contempt. 5
Gray reached the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a different posture. In the district court,"' after the defendant tenure committee members refused to respond to discovery questions regarding their votes, the
plaintiff moved to compel their responses pursuant to Rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 The plaintiff's motion and defendants' cross-motion for a protective order were referred to a magistrate,
who recommended that the district court order the defendants to answer
questions concerning their votes on the plaintiff's promotion and tenure
applications. The district court reversed the magistrate's recommendations and declined to order the defendants to answer the plaintiff's
questions, finding that "the secret tenure votes here meet the criteria for
the application of a qualified privilege .... ""
In reaching this determination, the district court purported to balance the right to discovery, which stems from society's interest in full
and fair adjudication, against society's interest in protecting the confidentiality of disclosures made during relationships of acknowledged social value. 9 After examining the right to discovery and Dean Wigmore's four fundamental conditions for establishing a privilege, the
district court evaluated the tenure committee's claim of privilege.5" The
" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42 Id. at 312. See notes 127-36 and accompanying text infra.
3 Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 432 (emphasis in original).
IId. (emphasis in original).
, Id. at 433.
" Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 92 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
4 Id. at 88.
,1Id. at 94.
41 Id. at 90.
50 The district court summarized the four conditions necessary for recognizing a
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court weighed the peer review system for granting tenure, and the adverse consequences of disclosing the secret votes claimed to be essential
to that system, against the benefit to the plaintiff which would flow
from requiring disclosure of such votes. Consistent with the approach
1
in Dinnan, the district court, citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents"
and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,2 asserted that the Supreme Court has attached constitutional significance to academic freedom."3 The court then observed, quoting liberally from the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles,S4 that "[tihe
tenure problem is an essential linchpin in . . . safeguard[ing] the aca-

demic freedom of individual teachers, [and] maintenance of the confidentiality of the decision-making process is generally an integral element of a peer review system for granting or withholding tenure."'55
The court emphasized the importance of the secret ballot in any voting
process as a means of freeing voters from undue influence or pressure
from those having power over the voter. While conceding that "those
voting on tenure decisions are not concerned about reprisals from those
about whom they must make judgments," the district court nevertheless
concluded that there was great value in maintaining secrecy: "It is not
difficult to perceive that the failure to maintain the confidentiality of
votes on tenure decisions would tend to promote divisiveness among
faculty members, and could well lead to Department Chairmen and
those with greater influence exerting a disproportionate impact on such
'
decisions." 56
The district court then concluded that because the plaintiff could obtain evidence to support his constitutional claim by means other than
discovery of the secret tenure votes, and because it was unclear whether
privilege: first, the communications must have been made with the understanding that
they would not be disclosed; second, the element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties; third, the

relationship must be one which, in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered; and fourth, the injury that will inure to the relationship by virtue of the

disclosure of the communications must outweigh the benefit that would result from
forcing a witness to disclose the information. Gray, 92 F.R.D. at 90 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
5, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
52 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957).
Gray, 92 F.R.D. at 91.
5 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
Gray, 92 F.R.D. at 92 (quoting AAUP Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure).
1 Id. at 93.
"
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the information the plaintiff sought shed light on his claim of race discrimination, the confidentiality of the tenure review system should be
protected."
The Second Circuit panel hearing the Gray appeal purported to
adopt the district court's approach to the case. Nevertheless, it reversed,
weighing the balance differently on the facts. 8 The court, citing Herbert v. Lando59 and Trammel v. United States,0 acknowledged the Supreme Court's dictum that "discovery rules are to be accorded broad
and liberal treatment, particularly where proof of intent is required,"..
and noted that federal courts have "flexibility to adopt rules of privilege
on a case by case basis.' 62 The Gray court, however, departed from the
no-privilege approach of the Dinnan court. It opted instead for the balancing approach taken by the court below, but struck the balance differently. 63 Citing its own authority that discriminatory intent must be
proved directly in a suit under section 1981, unlike in a suit under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in which it may be proved inferentially, 64 the court found that the plaintiff's need to know the votes of the
tenure committee members was "transparently evident."' 6 The court
continued:
Dr. Gray might prove LaGuardia's intent to discriminate if he could establish that [the defendant members of the Tenure Committee] harbored a
racial animus against him and that this was manifested in votes against his
57 Id. at 94. ("[Tlhe scales tip decidedly toward the protection of the confidentiality
of the faculty peer review system which [the court] views as embodying a broader social
value."). For a critique of the district court's holding in Gray, see Note, Academic
Freedom Privilege: An Excessive Solution to the Problem of ProtectingConfidentiality,
51 U. GIN. L. REV. 326 (1982). But see Comment, Balancing Academic Freedom and
Civil Rights: Toward an Appropriate Privilege for the Votes of Academic Peer Review
Committees, 68 IOWA L. REV. 585 (1983).
Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 902 (2d Cir. 1982).
441 U.S. 153, 170-75 (1979) (no first amendment privilege bars discovery of the
editorial processes of those responsible for publishing allegedly defamatory material).
" 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (petitioner could not invoke the spousal witness privilege
to bar his wife from testifying against him voluntarily).
" Gray, 692 F.2d at 904.
62 Id.
6, Id. at 902, 904.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) [hereafter title VIII.
For a discussion of title VII theories of recovery that avoid direct proof of discriminatory intent, see Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers to Equality for Faculty
Women, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 975 (1983) (supra this volume); Tepker, Title VII,
Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy: Toward a PrincipledDeference, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1047 (1983) (infra this volume).
" Gray, 692 F.2d at 905 (footnote omitted).
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reappointment and tenure - but to begin with he would, of course, have
to know the votes. Or, he could establish that the reasons given by the
[tenure] [clommittee for his actions were pretexts for its refusal to rehire
and tenure him - if the committee had given reasons."

Absent the disclosure of reasons for tenure denial, however, the defendant college could defeat the disclosure demand by disclaiming any
defense that would require disclosure to rebut. Without discovery of the
votes, the plaintiff could not prove intent to discriminate, a critical element of his case. 7
Noting the defendants' concern that compelled disclosure of tenure
committee votes would chill candid peer evaluations, disturb faculty relationships and thereby threaten academic freedom, the court addressed
the AAUP's brief. The brief urged that so long as an unsuccessful candidate is furnished with a meaningful statement of reasons and afforded
appropriate grievance procedures, the votes of the tenure committee
should be entitled to a qualified privilege. The court agreed:
We believe the position of the AAUP on the precise matter before us to
be carefully designed to protect confidentiality and encourage a candid
peer review process. It strikes an appropriate balance between academic
freedom and educational excellence on the one hand and individual rights
to fair consideration on the other, so that courts may steer the "careful
course between excessive intervention in the affairs of the university and
the unwarranted tolerance of unlawful behavior .... 6,

Dinnan and Gray thus reached similar results, but for quite different
reasons. Dinnan found no qualified privilege to be necessary, while
Gray recognized the need for such a privilege but considered it outweighed by the plaintiff's need to prove discriminatory intent.
III.

PLACING APPROPRIATE LIMITS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM

A.

TraditionalJudicial Deference

Federal courts traditionally have been reluctant to intervene in academic disputes. This principle of judicial deference to the judgment of
academics was recently reiterated by the United States Supreme Court
in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,70 in
which the Court observed:
66

Id. (citation omitted).

Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 907-08 (quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1154 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978)).
70

435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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[Wie decline to further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the
faculty-student relationship. We recognize, as did the Masschusetts Supreme Judicial Court over 60 years ago, that a hearing may be "useless or
harmful in finding out the truth as to scholarship.""

The doctrine of judicial deference has been particularly prominent in
cases involving sex discrimination in matters of reappointment, promotion, and tenure," and in at least some of the reported cases involving
race discrimination in academic institutions." For example, in Lewis v.
Chicago State College,"4 a case under the Civil Rights Act,7" the plaintiff sought promotion to full professor and alleged discrimination
against Black faculty members. Although the court found no racial
prejudice, it felt constrained to add that promotion decisions are not
normally justiciable. 6
" Id. at 90 (quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 23, 102
N.E. 1095, 1097 (1913)). One leading commentary notes:
While there are many cases in which judges refuse to hold colleges or
universities accountable in court due to some facet of the particular institution's legal identity, there are also numerous cases in which the courts,
as a matter of common law, refuse to intrude on the academic process.
The courts have traditionally refused to interfere in the basic academic
process of the university, particularly in the evaluation of students or
faculty.
• . . The doctrine of academic abstention has probably had one of its
cleanest statements, and its most dramatic impact, in the area of academic
sex discrimination, where none of the first thirty-odd cases reported have
been decided in favor of the plaintiff faculty member.
H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 14 (1979).
72 See, e.g., Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F.
Supp. 639, 653 (D. Mass.
1977) (because "tenure decisions normally involve difficult qualitative judgments," the
courts should be reluctant "to override faculty appointments and tenure decisions absent an impermissible discrimination by the university or college"); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (D. Md. 1977) ("[Plromotion decisions in
academia necessarily involve matters of professional judgment. The courts are, therefore, reluctant to substitute their judgment for the judgment of academics with expertise
in their respective fields.") (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., Labat v. Board of Higher Educ., 401 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) ("Of all fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over,
education and faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least suited
for federal court supervision.") (quoting Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229,
1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974)); Moore v. Kibbee, 381 F. Supp. 834, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
1969) (noting that
Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (N.D. Ill.
"the judiciary is not the appropriate forum for decisions involving academic rank").
" 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Iil. 1969).
,542 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
76 Lewis, 299 F. Supp. at 1360.
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Perhaps the strongest assertion of the doctrine of judicial deference is
found in the opinion of the Second Circuit in Faro v. New York University." Faro involved an action under title VII in which the female
plaintiff charged that a change in her tenure track employment status
was the result of sex bias or discrimination. In affirming the district
court's finding of no sex bias or discrimination, the Second Circuit
stated: "Of all fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade
and take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level
are probably the least suited for federal court supervision."78
Similarly, in Megill v. Board of Regents, 9 the Fifth Circuit rejected
a university professor's civil rights action against the state Board of Regents for refusing to grant him tenure. The professor had alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights of free speech and due process, but
the court adhered to "the policy that federal courts should be loathe to
intrude into internal school affairs."8 Likewise, in Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh,8 a federal district court noted that it had found no
title VII case ordering tenure and promotion of a college professor over
the judgment of academic professionals. 2 Having observed that a university's tenure criteria could not be used "as window dressing to disguise . . . invidious sex discrimination,"83 the court nevertheless followed the pattern of denying relief, noting that it was not a "Super
' The court
Tenure Committee." 84
concluded that a tenure decision cannot be made by a court but instead must be made by the faculty, the
administration, and the trustees of the university. 5
B.

Rejection of the Traditional View

Five years ago, in Powell v. Syracuse University,8 6 the do6trine of
judicial deference in academic matters received serious reconsideration
and sharp criticism. Ironically, this criticism came from the same federal court which three years earlier, in Faro v. New York University,"
had made one of the strongest and most influential statements of the
502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).

, Id. at 1231-32.

19 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
"

16

Io at 1077 (citations omitted).
Id.
435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1353.
IId.; see also note 73 supra.
580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).
502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
57
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doctrine. In Powell, the plaintiff alleged that termination of her employment contract resulted from discrimination based on race, color,
and sex. Although the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order
dismissing the petition, its comments addressing the question of judicial
deference warrant extensive quotation. The court stated:
In recent years, many courts have cited the Faro opinion for the broad
proposition that courts should exercise minimal scrutiny of college and
university employment practices. Other courts, while not citing Faro, have
concurred in its sentiments.
This -anti-interventionist policy has rendered colleges and universities
virtually immune to charges of employment bias, at least when that bias is
not expressed overtly. We fear, however, that the commonsense position
we took in Faro, namely that courts must be ever-mindful of relative institutional competences, has been pressed beyond all reasonable limits, and
may be employed to undercut the explicit legislative intent of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In affirming here, we do not rely on any such policy

of self-abnegation where colleges are concerned. 8

While I do not suggest that the doctrine of judicial deference in academic employment discrimination cases was finally laid to rest in Powell,89 cases after Powell provide encouragement to plaintiffs claiming
that negative promotion and tenure decisions were influenced by sex or
race bias. In Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College,0
the plaintiff in a title VII suit charged that the failure to promote her
to the rank of full professor was the result of sex discrimination. In
sustaining the claim, the First Circuit conceded that most of the evidence did not prove discrimination against the plaintiff in particular
and that the facts revealed a "close case."9 The court nevertheless endorsed the district court's conclusion that the reasons given for failure
to promote were influenced by the plaintiff's gender.9 2 Significantly,
both the lower court and the appellate court thoroughly reviewed the
evidence before the tenure committee and freely questioned and rejected
the committee's judgments based on that evidence, without any suggestion that academic expertise demanded judicial deference to those
judgments.
The following year, in Kunda v. Muhlenberg College,93 the Third
Circuit decided a title VII action in which the plaintiff alleged sex dis"
Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
984 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
" See, e.g., Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 639-40 (4th Cir. 1979).
604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).

at 114.
Id. at 113.
" 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).

9I Id.
92
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crimination by a college in its failure to promote her and grant her
tenure. The district court had ordered the plaintiff reinstated to her
faculty position with back pay and promoted to the rank of assistant
professor, together with an award of tenure on the condition that the
plaintiff achieve a master's degree within two years."4 Affirming the
district court's order, the court of appeals significantly rejected the assertion by the college and a number of amici that the district court's
judgment regarding tenure was "an unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into the academic mission of an educational institution which...
threatens academic freedom itself."95 Although endorsing basic academic freedom principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, and asserting the entitlement of academic freedom to "maximum protection," the
court refused to accept the proposition that academic freedom is implicated in every employment decision of an educational institution. 6 The
court further observed:
The fact that the discrimination in this case took place in an academic

rather than commercial setting does not permit the court to abdicate its
responsibility to insure the award of a meaningful remedy. Congress did
not intend that those institutions which employ persons who work primarily with their mental faculties should enjoy a different status under Title
VII than those who work primarily with their hands."

Because of the clear congressional intent to subject educational institutions to title VII requirements and the documented history of employment discrimination against women in academic institutions,"8 the
Third Circuit in Kunda refused to adopt a position of judicial deference. The court also noted with approval the opinion of the Second
Circuit in Powell v. Syracuse University.9
In its decision in In re Dinnan, the Fifth Circuit, citing Kunda with
approval, similarly declined to adopt the posture of judicial deference:
"Here the allegation is that the appellee was discriminated against,
precisely the situation that the Third Circuit envisioned in Kunda v.
Muhlenberg College in which courts should intervene."'' 0 In Gray v.
Board of Higher Education, however, the Second Circuit reached the
" Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 463 F. Supp. 294, 314-15 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
" Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980).
96 Id.
" Id.
" See

at 550.

notes 106-16 and accompanying text infra.
580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); see also Jepsen v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (also approving Powell).
"0 In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original), cert.
denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
"
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contrary result, adopting the doctrine of judicial deference in substance
and effect. 0 1
Contrary to the Gray court's holding, the concept of academic freedom has no relevance whatsoever to protecting confidentiality and encouraging candid peer review in the context of claims of sex or race
discrimination in academic employment.
C. The Link Between Judicial Deference and University
Discrimination
In the following paragraphs, I shall argue that in light of the interests involved in Dinnan and Gray, the court in Dinnan properly intervened on the plaintiffs behalf and rejected Professor Dinnan's claim of
academic freedom. The court in Gray, on the other hand, while technically granting the plaintiff relief, did so in a manner unlikely to provide
relief to claimants who in the future seek to show unlawful discrimination in tenure decisions. Moreover, the Gray decision will provide to
the tenured professoriate and to academic institutions privileges which
are unsupported by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court as it has
defined the contours of academic freedom.
In reaching its decision, the Gray court without hesitation or criticism adopted the AAUP Preliminary Statement on Judicially Compelled Disclosure,102 summarizing the statement as follows:
The AAUP statement . . . concludes that faculty members, upon re-

quest, should be informed in writing of the reasons for a decision against
reappointment. Recognizing the latitude that must be given the institution
acting through its faculty, but balancing academic freedom against standards of fairness, the Statement seeks to take into account the confusion
that can occur between the limited rights of probationary faculty members
and the due process rights guaranteed to tenured faculty, but nevertheless
determines that reasons must be given the faculty member denied reappointment or tenure who requests them. This is to permit the rejected
probationer to remedy identified shortcomings, to correct erroneous infor-

mation on which the peer review committee based its decisions, as well as
perhaps to realize that the decision resulted from institutional considerations unrelated to his or her competence.'

3

The court's uncritical acceptance of the AAUP Statement would be
considerably more persuasive were it not for the sorry record of academic institutions in making appointment and reappointment decisions,
101

Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1982). See text

accompanying note 69 supra.
'o' AAUP Disclosure Statement, note 17 supra.
103 Gray, 692 F.2d at 907.
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and the extent to which standards of fairness have not characterized
such decisions."' The court in Gray viewed the AAUP Statement as
striking a balance between "academic freedom and educational excellence" on the one hand, and "individual rights to fair consideration" on
the other.' °5 The evidence, however, if not overwhelming, at least
strongly suggests that neither standards of educational excellence nor
fair consideration have characterized academic appointment, reappointment, and tenure decisions in cases in which applicants were women or
minorities. There is no lack of documentation of sex discrimination in
academia. One study, for example, found discriminatory behavior on
the part of male colleagues and employers to be a "major hindrance to
the career development of professional women" in academia.'" 6 The author found that the most common form of discrimination, in addition to
salary discrepancies, was differential treatment regarding promotions,
tenure, and seniority.' 7 Ironically, academic women who were professionally active or engaged in substantial publication, an activity generally acknowledged to be of primary importance in tenure decisions, reported more experiences with employer discrimination. 0 '
A more recent study of academic women noted the lesser proportion
of women doctorates appointed to academic positions as compared to
men, and stated that "[e]ven if a woman is hired to a faculty position, it
is very likely that she will encounter a struggle when it comes to promotion. .

. Most women are clustered at the lower ranks, in nonlad-

der research and lecture positions, and in the less prestigious institutions."'0 9 Another study amply supports the foregoing observations.
Evaluating the importance of merit principles, the author observes:
[T]he case has been somewhat overstated: The professoriate are not necessarily judged on the basis of the quality of their research or teaching, that
is, they are not necessarily judged according to how well they perform the
central academic functions, which is the meaning of merit; other factors
less vital to the dissemination of knowledge are as important to the careers

of university professors."

In support of these conclusions, the author found that during the
See generally K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 869-86 (1974).
104

105

Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1982).

,0'H. ASTIN, THE WOMAN DOCTORATE IN AMERICA 110 (1969).

107
Id.
,0I
Id. at 148.
'09

WOMEN IN ACADEMIA: EVOLVING POLICIES TOWARD EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 2

(E. Wasserman, A. Lewin & L. Bleineis eds. 1975).
110L. LEWIS, SCALING THE IVORY TOWER 8 (1975).
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1959-60 academic year, women held only 9.9 percent of the professorships and 17.5 percent of the associate professorships, with somewhat
higher percentages at lower ranks."' With respect to race, the same
author cites an earlier study of university faculty characteristics which
revealed that almost 98 percent of the faculty members were white." '
The authors of a leading work devoted to sex discrimination summarized the dismal situation of academic women as follows:
Perhaps surprising, but by now well documented, the relative representation and status of women as faculty members at universities and colleges
deteriorated from the 1930s to the 1970s. The proportion of women serving in academic positions declined. Salary differentials associated with sex
were marked and prevailed for every race. Legislation in the 1960s
prohibiting sex discrimination in employment left academic employment
untouched. The Equal Pay Act did not apply to academic and professional
employees until amended in July 1972. Title VII excluded academic employment until its scope was enlarged by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ...

The desire to ameliorate the status of women and minorities in
academia"" is clearly reflected in the congressional debates which preceded the 1972 extension of the antidiscrimination provisions of title
VII to academic institutions." 5 Ironically, in light of the posture subse"I Id. at 129. On the subject of tenure and promotion of faculty women, Lewis
further observes:
In 1972, of the 4,470 tenured professors in seven Ivy League institutions
plus the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, only 151 were women.
The ratio of women to men is even more unfavorable at the level of full
professor. For example, for the 1969-70 academic year no full professor at
Harvard was a woman (except for the holder of one chair endowed for a
female). It was reported in Science in 1972 that in major universities one
in fifty full professors was a woman. Over a period of close to seventy
years, no woman junior appointee in six social science departments at the
University of Chicago was advanced to the rank of full professor. In the
spring of 1969, 11 out of 475 full professors at the University of Chicago
were women (and only 16 out of 217 associate professors were women).
Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
112Id. at 17.
"i K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, note 104 supra, at 870.
.. See generally Astin & Berger, Sex Discrimination in Academe, in ACADEMIC
WOMEN ON THE MOVE (A. Rossi & A. Calderwood eds. 1973).
"' Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat.
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
The debates which preceded passage of the amendments contain frequent references
to the status of women and minorities, of which the following are examples:
As regards minorities, statistical studies show that minorities are generally underrepresented in teaching positions in educational institutions, and
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quently assumed by the defendants in Dinnan and Gray, the title VII
amendments were unopposed by the academic community, and academic leaders 6were among the supporters of the fight against
discrimination.' 1
Thus, there appears to be a clear consensus, supported by ample evidence, that academic institutions have engaged in sex and race discrimination to at least the same extent as other societal institutions. The title
VII amendments,"' reflecting values similar to those inherent in the
those that are employed are relegated to the lower paying and less prestigious positions ....
This underrepresentation becomes more pronounced
when we look at the institutions of higher learning where Negroes account
for only 2.2 percent of all faculty, Orientals 1.3 percent, and all other
minorities only 0.3 percent.
118 CONG. REC. 1992 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
The Senator also noted the existence of discrimination against women in higher educational institutions:
In institutions of higher education, women are almost totally absent in
the position of academic dean, and are grossly underrepresented in all
other major faculty positions. Also, I would add, that this discrimination
does not only exist as regards to the acquiring of jobs, but that it is similarly prevalent in the area of salaries and promotions where studies have
shown a well-established pattern of unlawful wage differentials and discriminatory promotion policies.
Id.
Another Senator also noted the widespread discrimination against women teachers
and administrators:
[Tihe rule is that once hired, women do not recieve advancement as often
as men. While almost half of the male teachers are given the status of full
professor, only 10 percent of the women make it that far. As a result, the
highest faculty ranks are weighted with men; the lowest rank with women.
118 CONG. REC. 3936 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
A House Report accompanying the Act detailed a similar effect:
Discrimination against minorities and women in the field of education is
as pervasive as discrimination in any other area of employment. In the
field of higher education, the fact that black scholars have been generally
relegated to all-black institutions, or have been restricted to lesser academic positions when they have been permitted entry into white institutions is common knowledge. Similarly, in the area of sex discrimination,
women have long been invited to participate as students in the academic
process, but without the prospect of gaining employment as serious
scholars.
H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2137, 2155.
"' See Vanderwaerdt, Higher Education Discrimination and the Courts, 10 J.L. &
EDUC. 467, 467-68 (1981).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

19831

Tenure Committee Deliberations

1043

Civil Rights Act,'" 8 demonstrate a clear congressional intent to secure
for academic persons the right of admission to and participation in academic enterprises free of invidious sex or race discrimination. As suggested above, traditional notions of judicial deference should not be permitted to thwart this intent.'"
Similarly, an unwarranted expansion of the concept of academic
freedom should not be permitted to further constrict the ability of
plaintiffs to prove race and sex discrimination by academic institutions.120 The Dinnan court, I would suggest, in flatly declining to recognize or create any privilege which might permit a tenured professor
to refuse to reveal his promotion or tenure votes, took proper account of
the foregoing considerations. The Gray court, on the other hand, while
mandating disclosure of the tenure vote in the particular circumstances
of the case, nevertheless implicitly created a qualified academic freedom
privilege.' 2 ' Apart from whatever policy considerations may suggest
protection of tenure and promotion votes from disclosure, academic
freedom principles do not require such protection and indeed, do not
justify it.
D.

Whose Academic Freedom is Protected by Nondisclosure?

It is not clear from the court's opinion in Gray whether the protection of academic freedom applies to individual tenure committee members or to universities as institutions. Extending this protection to either
party, however, exceeds the scope of academic freedom.
The first obvious possibility is that protection is afforded in some
circumstances to the professors who are members of college and university tenure committees. The Gray court so hinted by referring to the
concerns of the district court and the appellees that "candid peer evaluation will be chilled, and the harmony of faculty relations will be disturbed .... ,,12
Virtually identical concerns were raised in Dinnan,
and the court's response in rejecting them is persuasive. After noting
that its opinion should signal to potential wrongdoers that the cloak of
"academic freedom" cannot be used to avoid responsibility for their actions,2 3 the court concluded:
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
,' See text accompanying notes 98-101 supra.
220 See Machiup, note 10 supra, at 761.
'" See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
222 Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1982).
223 In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan
v. Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
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No one compelled Professor Dinnan to take part in the tenure decision
process. Persons occupying positions of responsibility, like Dinnan, often
must make dillicult decisions. The consequence of such responsibility is
that occasionally the decision-maker will be called upon to explain his
actions. In such a case, he must have the courage to stand up and publicly
account for his decision. If that means that a few weak-willed academic
individuals will be deterred from serving in positions of public trust, so be
it; society is better off without their services. If the decision-maker has
acted for legitimate reasons, he has nothing to fear. We find nothing heroic or noble about the appellant's position; we see only an attempt to
avoid responsibility for his actions. If the appellant was unwilling to accept responsibility for his actions, he should never have taken part in the
tenure decision-making process. However, once he accepted such a role of
public trust, he subjected himself to explaining to the public24and any affected individual his decisions and the reasons behind them.'

The Dinnan court thus properly recognized that the protection of
secrecy in the tenurial process on the grounds of academic freedom
would be a perversion of academic freedom principles. Mandatory disclosure of votes and deliberations relating to tenure and promotion decisions in no way impairs the values which are central to the concept of
academic freedom; namely, the freedom of individual academic men
(and occasionally women) to research and teach, and the freedom of
25
students to learn.1

The second possible answer to the inquiry of whose academic freedom is protected by nondisclosure is that "institutional academic freedom" is protected by keeping tenure and promotion votes and deliberations secret.'"2 "Institutional academic freedom," although the subject of
at least two recent student comments in the law review literature,'" has
not received explicit recognition by a majority of the United States Supreme Court in any of its opinions marking the perimeters of academic
freedom. The source of the concept of institutional academic freedom is
Id.
Kadish, note 12 supra, at 166; see also Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of
Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404 ANNALS 140 (1972):
The phrase "academic freedom" in the context "the academic freedom
of a faculty member of an institution of higher learning," refers to a set of
vocational liberties: to teach, to investigate, to do research, and to publish
on any subject as a matter of professional interest, without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanction, save only upon adequate demonstration of
an inexcusable breach of professional ethics in the exercise of any of them.
Id. at 146; see also Fuchs, note 11 supra.
,26 See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
Note, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed
Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1538 (1981); Note, Testing the Limits
of Academic Freedom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 712 (1982).
124
2:

19831

Tenure Committee Deliberations

1045

Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.' 8 Alluding to "the dependence of a free society on free universities," which "means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the
intellectual life of a university,"" Justice Frankfurter quoted with approval the statement of a conference of senior scholars from South African universities which concluded:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university - to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
0
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."1

Although the Court rendered a number of opinions defining the
boundaries of academic freedom,' the notion of institutional academic
freedom contained in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy remained
unremarked upon for more than three decades. It finally reemerged in
Regents of the. University of California v. Bakke, in Justice Powell's
opinion' 32 announcing the judgment of the Court but writing for himself only. In a context entirely different from Sweezy or from the cases
which have been the focus of this Article,' 33 Justice Powell included the
selection of its student body as within the freedom of a university to
make its own judgments, and quoted with approval Justice Frankfurter's summary of the "four essential freedoms" comprising academic
freedom.' 3
It is fair to conclude that the Sweezy concurrence, together with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, are insubstantial foundations upon
which to build a theory of institutional academic freedom which would
preserve the secrecy of promotion and tenure votes and deliberations.
The Dinnan court properly rejected the appellant's arguments in reliance on this aspect of Bakke, noting that the plaintiff in that case was
alleging a denial of tenure based on other than academic grounds. Accordingly, the so-called essential freedom of an institution to decide on
academic grounds who may teach was, on the facts, clearly "outside of
what the Bakke Court envisioned to be the limits of academic free120

"I

354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957).
Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See notes 20-30. and accompanying text supra.

32

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

,' Bakke involved the challenge of a white male to the admissions policy of the
University of California, Davis, medical school, which took race into consideration in
admission decisions.
"' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
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Certainly, it would be an unwarranted expansion of academic

freedom to permit a claim of institutional academic freedom to impair
the ability of claimants to prove sex and race discrimination in tenure
and promotion decisions.' 36
CONCLUSION

Nearly twenty years ago, in its first definitive pronouncement on the
subject, the United States Supreme Court viewed academic freedom as
"a special concern of the First Amendment."1 37 The Court's decisions
prior to and subsequent to Keyishian clearly identify academic freedom
as a right attending to individuals to teach, write, conduct research, and
speak freely. Reliance upon academic freedom principles to protect the
secrecy of university and college tenure deliberations and votes, rejected
in Dinnan and implicitly adopted in Gray, protects institutions at the
expense of individual rights.'3 8 When infringement of such rights is alleged, academic institutions and tenure committee members who have
authority to implement the policies of those institutions should be held
accountable and responsible for their actions. In the context of tenure
and promotion decisions, the creation of an evidentiary privilege based
upon academic freedom is in derogation of the principles upon which
academic freedom is based.

...In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 431 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan
v. Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
136 For a discussion reaching a similar conclusion, see Comment, Academic Freedom
vs. Title VII. Will Employment Opportunity Be Denied on Campus?, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 989 (1981). An argument to the contrary, urging constitutional protection of the
autonomy of educational institutions in hiring decisions, may be found in Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. REV. 879
(1979).
"3 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
38 Such a use of academic freedom to create a privilege for tenure committee decisions would be particularly invidious in a case in which tenure is denied because of a
professor's exercise of his own academic freedom. Assume, for example, that a professor
refuses to award a grade to a particular student at the behest of the professor's superiors. Under the holding of Gray, there is at least the possibility that a court would allow
a tenure committee to thwart a legitimate exercise of academic freedom without accountability, so long as some statement of reasons is supplied. Such a result would work
precisely in opposition to the values which academic freedom is designed to foster.

